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Abstract 
 
We add to neglected research on how venture resources and founder experience outside the home 
country interplay in facilitating venture creation speed. In particular, we investigate how returnee 
entrepreneurs inﬂuence the role of venture resources in the speed of  
entrepreneurial entry. Using a novel sample of 388 new ventures covering a range of technologies in 
China, we ﬁnd that returnees from abroad are slower in new venture entry in the home country, 
compared with homegrown entrepreneurs. At the same time, ventures with innovative technology and 
backed by foreign capital are slower to set up due to higher levels of liability of newness and liability of 
foreignness. However, when these ﬁrms have a returnee founder who can leverage their experience 
with foreign resources and technological knowhow, such negative effects on entry speed are 
signiﬁcantly mitigated. We discuss implications for further research and practice. 
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Executive summary 
 
A developing research stream has analyzed the unique role of returnees in ﬁlling important 
entrepreneurial gaps in markets in emerging economies. Of particular importance in emerging 
economies that feature great uncertainties and fast changes in market opportunities is the time spent 
converting an idea into a business. However, we lack understanding of how returnee founder 
characteristics and venture resources play out in shaping the speed of opportunity enactment during the 
process of new venture creation. 
The capability of returnees to make better use of advanced technological knowhow and foreign 
capital resources resulting from their experience abroad may help them speedily overcome the hurdles 
in establishing their ventures because of the beneﬁts they offer in boosting the development of 
technology industries in their home countries. However, by virtue of having been away from their home 
market they may lack knowledge about home market institutions or social capital from not being able to 
develop local networks, which may slow their ability to establish their ventures. Hence, contextual 
inﬂuences on the different resources available to returnee entrepreneurs may have positive or negative 
inﬂuences on their entry speed. Accordingly, our research questions are: To what extent does returnee 
entrepreneurs' lack of immediate embeddedness in domestic institutional environment slow their speed 
of entry compared to local entrepreneurs? To what extent can returnee entrepreneurs help ventures 
with innovative technology and those backed by foreign capital in the speed of creating the business? 
We develop and test hypotheses on a representative sample of 388 new technology ﬁrms in 13 
major incubators and science parks in Beijing with follow-up face-to-face interviews with 36 returnees 
and non-returnee founders. 
We ﬁnd that returnees are slower in new venture entry in the home country, compared with 
homegrown entrepreneurs. But ventures with innovative technology and backed by foreign capital are 
slower to set up due to higher levels of liabilities of newness and foreignness. However, if these ﬁrms 
have a returnee founder who can leverage experience with foreign resources and technological 
knowhow, such negative effects are mitigated. 
By comparing the gestation process between returnee and local entrepreneurs, we contribute 
ﬁrstly by advancing research on returnee entrepreneurship by adding to an emerging series of studies 
addressing the challenges faced by returnee entrepreneurs compared to their local counterparts. 
Interestingly, while past research has placed emphasis on resources associated with social capital for 
returnee entrepreneurship, we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients in respect of our variables relating to the 
role of family and friends. Rather, speed of entry by returnees is strongly related to ﬁnancial and 
technology resources. 
Second, by exploring the speed of entry by returnee entrepreneurs in an emerging market 
context, we contribute by showing that absence from the home market context can slow entry speed. 
Finally, and more generally, we extend limited previous analyses that have suggested the importance of 
experience in different institutional environments to highlight that time to entry may vary between 
different types of founders. 
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Our ﬁndings suggest returnee entrepreneurs need to be aware that exposure to commercial 
environments in developed economies is not sufﬁcient to facilitate speedy entry into their home 
market. Returnees able to access foreign capital as a result of their experiences in developed economies 
build ﬁnancial resources that enable speedier access to markets. Returnees able to develop innovative 
technology prior to entry may be at a resource advantage and thus are able to enter environments of 
technological deﬁcits more speedily. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Returnee entrepreneurs are migrants returning from work or education in a developed 
economy to their home country to start a new venture. A developing research stream has analyzed the 
unique role of returnees in ﬁlling important entrepreneurial gaps in emerging economies (Li et al., 2012; 
Qin and Estrin, 2015; Saxenian, 2006; Wright et al., 2008). Although much attention has been devoted to 
the outcomes of businesses created by returnees (Kenney et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2010; Wright et al., 
2008), very little is understood regarding the process of their venture creation activities, in particular the 
pre-launch phase. The time spent converting an idea into a business is particularly important in markets 
that feature great uncertainties and fast changes in market opportunities (Lévesque and Shepherd, 
2004), such as emerging economies. However, we lack understanding of how returnee founder 
characteristics and venture resources play out in shaping the speed of opportunity enactment during the 
process of new venture creation. 
The capability of returnees to make better use of advanced technological knowhow and foreign 
capital resources resulting from their experience abroad may help them to speedily overcome the 
hurdles in establishing their ventures because of the beneﬁts they offer in boosting the development of 
technology industries in their home countries (Wright et al., 2008). However, by virtue of having been 
away from their home market they may lack knowledge about home market institutions or social capital 
from not being able to develop local networks, which may slow their ability to establish their ventures. 
Hence, contextual inﬂuences on the different resources available to returnee entrepreneurs may have 
positive or negative inﬂuences on their entry speed. 
Accordingly, our research questions are: To what extent does returnee entrepreneurs' lack of 
immediate embeddedness in the domestic institutional environment slow their speed of entry 
compared to local entrepreneurs? To what extent can returnee entrepreneurs help ventures with 
innovative technology and those backed by foreign capital in the speed of creating the business? We 
investigate these issues in the setting of China – the world's largest emerging economy featuring highly 
dynamic and uncertain market situations. China is also well known for being one of the countries 
observing accelerated returnee entrepreneurship by the so-called ‘sea turtles’ (Li et al., 2012; Wright et 
al., 2008). 
Using a novel survey of new ventures covering a range of technologies in China, we ﬁnd that in 
general returnees are slower in enacting an entrepreneurial opportunity in their home country, 
compared with homegrown entrepreneurs; it takes longer for them to set up the business. However, 
their presence can signiﬁcantly expedite the entry of ventures backed by foreign capital and involving 
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innovative technology, while ventures of these kinds usually suffer liability of foreignness and liability of 
newness, and are much slower to set up. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we advance research speciﬁcally 
on returnee entrepreneurship by adding to an emerging series of studies addressing the challenges 
faced by returnee entrepreneurs compared to their local counterparts. While past research has placed 
emphasis on resources associated with social capital for returnee entrepreneurship, in contrast we ﬁnd 
that speed of entry by returnees is strongly related to ﬁnancial and technology resources. While 
returnees' absence from the home market context can slow entry speed compared with local 
entrepreneurs, returnee founders who can leverage experience with foreign resources and 
technological knowhow can mitigate the negative effects of the liabilities of newness and foreignness 
experienced by local entrepreneurs. 
Second, our ﬁndings contribute by shedding new light on the business gestation process in 
different contexts (Davidsson, 2016; Liao and Welsch, 2008; McMullen and Dimov, 2013; Samuelsson 
and Davidsson, 2009) by showing that time to entry is inﬂuenced by the nature of the different 
institutional environments where entrepreneurs have gained experience, that is whether entrepreneurs 
are returnees or local. As such we also extend explanations of important variations across gestation 
processes along the temporal dimension. 
Figure 1 Determinants of time to entrepreneurship entry 
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Entrepreneurship scholars have long been interested in the process of venture founding (Shane 
and Khurana, 2003). While considerable insights have been generated about factors determining 
success or failure of venture emergence, much less is understood regarding the attributes of its process. 
Among these attributes, temporal issues are perceived to ‘uniquely and explicitly characterize the 
entrepreneurial process’ and ‘contemporary studies of entrepreneurship connote a dynamic of 
movement across time’ (Bird and West, 1997, p.5). 
Speed constitutes a critical competency for any ﬁrm (Wiggins and Rueﬂi, 2005). It is particularly 
relevant to businesses operating in high velocity environments (Eisenhardt, 1989). Previous research has 
generated rich insights into the performance out- comes of speed (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Capelleras et 
al., 2010). Although evidence of the performance outcome of speed has not been conclusive, and faster 
is not always better, such time-based foundation characterizes important strategies of entrepreneurial 
ﬁrms. As time is a scarce resource (Markman et al., 2005), and especially so for entrepreneurs 
(Capelleras and Greene, 2008), by accelerating the pace of converting an idea into a business, 
entrepreneurs are more able to capture the window of opportunity in a fast-changing environment and 
obtain an upper hand in competition. Entry speed is becoming increasingly important given fast 
technological advancement and intensifying competition from global markets. 
Previous research on speed has usually examined it in the contexts of decision making (Bakker 
and Shepherd, 2017; Forbes, 2005), innovation and new product development (Chen et al., 2010; 
Markman et al., 2005), investment (Pacheco-de-Almeida et al., 2015), market entry (Hawk et al., 2013), 
and mergers and acquisitions (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). Through a meta- analysis, Chen et al. (2010) 
grouped the antecedents of new product development speed into strategy, project, process, and team.1 
Most settings for these studies concern established organizations. 
Resource acquisition, however, is central to entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The ability to assemble 
desirable resources is essential to success in the enactment of entrepreneurial opportunities in both 
resource muniﬁcent and resource scarce environments (Hayward et al., 2006). While resources are 
central to the strategic entrepreneurship literature in general, the bricolage literature recognized that in 
resource scarce environments entrepreneurs create from what they have in hand (Baker and Nelson, 
2005). Neither literature has paid much attention to the speed of entrepreneurship entry. How fast 
entrepreneurs can realize their idea and move from a concept to a real business largely depends on the 
acquisition of critical resources and the nature of those resources. Therefore, in what follows we bring 
resources to the analysis of the important temporal aspect of entrepreneur- ship entry and delve deeper 
into the interplay between resources and founder characteristics. The theoretical framework we 
develop is presented in Fig. 1 and the associated hypotheses are developed in what follows. 
 
2.2. Returnee entrepreneurs and entry speed 
 
                                                          
1 With a few exceptions, for example Markman et al. (2005) who highlighted the role of experience and 
competency of university technology transfer offices, the extant literature on speed, in general, has made little 
explicit reference to resources. Although resources have been extensively studied in the context of venture entry 
(e.g. Knight and Cavusgil, 2004), the discussion on speed of venture entry is scant. 
6 
 
Returnee entrepreneurship offers an intriguing setting to study entry speed. Entrepreneurs who 
enter international markets are likely to experience a liability of foreignness as operating in a foreign 
market often requires knowledge different from that accumulated in the domestic market (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977). The differences in institutional environment between home and host countries may 
limit returnees' ability to transfer organizational practices smoothly across borders (Xu and Shenkar, 
2002). This problem may be especially acute due to the institutional differences between developed and 
emerging economies (Bruton et al., 2013). 
Emerging economies feature distinctive institutional environments that are, in many aspects - 
be it regulatory, normative, or cognitive – different from developed economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000, 
2013). When the overall institutional environment is drastically changing and, at the same time, formal 
institutions are still underdeveloped, knowledge about institutions can often only be obtained through 
experience and networks. For instance, Zhu et al. (2012) ﬁnd that regulations faced by small and 
medium sized enterprises in China are frequently unclear and, in particular, the proceedings concerning 
enterprise establishment approval and registration are complicated and time-consuming. 
Although returnees may have accumulated human capital and ﬁnancial capital through overseas 
experience, they have missed exposure to the fast changing domestic institutional environment. 
Understanding the ﬁne-grained local setting is particularly important in the Chinese context due to its 
distinct regulatory environment. Regulations in China are largely formulated  and enforced at the local 
level (Peng, 2000; Zhou, 2013). Understanding the local regulatory regime takes time and is an especially 
difﬁcult task to manage at a distance for returnees. Thus unfamiliarity with the institutional 
environment may constitute a big obstacle to returnees in their actions and processes in setting up a 
business. 
Meanwhile, the important role of guanxi, or informal networks, in doing business in China is 
well-recognized (Peng and Luo, 2000). As it is usually much easier for people to develop social networks 
in geographically proximate locations, compared to their local counterparts, it usually takes returnees 
more time to build connections with local suppliers, clients, and distribution channels, as well as other 
important stakeholders. Navigating the business environment, gaining knowledge about informational 
institutions, and establishing networks with important stakeholders all take time. 
In sum, while returnees may have certain advantages in identifying market opportunities, their 
lack of direct experience and knowledge about domestic institutions may constrain their ability to enact 
their entrepreneurial idea and thus impede their venture creation process. In other words it may take 
them longer to transform the idea into a business. Hence: 
H1. Returnees take longer than homegrown entrepreneurs to set up their businesses. 
 
2.3. Liability of foreignness and liability of newness in entrepreneurship entry 
In this section we set out our baseline hypotheses regarding the effects of foreign capital and 
innovative technology. 
 
2.3.1. Foreign capital 
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A key insight of international business research concerns the liability of foreignness that  foreign  
ﬁrms suffer when  entering a new market (Wuebker et al., 2010). Capelleras and Greene (2008) argued 
that entrepreneurs who rely on nearer sources  of  ﬁnance move faster to create their venture.  In 
contrast, ventures  seeking ﬁnance from overseas  may be slowed in their entry process. At the selection 
stage, foreign capital providers take longer to make investment decisions as they need to assess very 
incomplete information about the venture in a distant environment (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003).  
Foreign  capital  providers  likely  take longer to build the contacts they need for this process, hence 
creating greater delay. Further, local investment managers may need to refer the proposal to the ﬁrm's 
overall investment committee in the home country head ofﬁce for approval (Wright et al., 2002). Early-
stage capital plays a very important role in new venture performance as it provides ventures not only 
with ﬁnancial resources but also advice, contacts, and experiences, as well as organizational support 
such as corporate governance practices (Wright et al., 2005), helping founders overcome uncertainty 
and risks associated with new venture  creation  (Gompers  and Lerner, 2001). Foreign capital is 
constrained in these aspects in comparison with domestic capital. With more limited support  from 
foreign capital, higher transaction costs and longer learning process, ﬁrms backed by foreign capital can 
be expected  to be  much slower to set up. Thus our baseline hypothesis regarding foreign capital is: 
H2. Ventures backed by foreign capital take more time to set up. 
 
2.3.2. Innovative technology 
New ventures, in general, typically suffer a liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) which could 
be especially severe for ﬁrms with novel technology. Previous research has distinguished initiators from 
imitators (Amason et al., 2006). Innovative technology constitutes valuable resources for ﬁrms, yet 
ventures with new technology need to manage without the beneﬁt of precedents. While their less novel 
counterparts can learn by watching, they can only learn by doing (Amason et al., 2006). This learning 
process could signiﬁcantly slow the setting up of the business. 
Moreover, innovative technology can make the start-up process more complex, requiring a 
longer duration for the venture op- portunity to be enacted (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009). 
Ventures with innovative technology likely require more actions to proceed, and it takes more time 
around planning and activities such as intellectual property protection (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 
2009). 
In addition, legitimacy problems could be exacerbated where the founders need to spend time 
on convincing stakeholders about the value and reliability of their key technology resources. 
Innovative technology also leads to higher uncertainty regarding the technology, legal 
protection as well as market uncertainty (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010). Resolving this uncertainty likely 
contribute to a longer duration for the entrepreneurs to enact the venture idea. 
Hence our baseline hypothesis regarding innovative technology is: 
H3. Ventures with innovative technology take more time to set up. 
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2.4. Expedited entry—the moderating effects of returnee founders 
 
From the resource-based view and dynamic capabilities perspectives, a ﬁrm's distinctive abilities 
to coordinate, combine, and transform ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets are key to organization outcomes (Teece et 
al., 1997). In particular, a CEO's international experience is more likely to generate value when bundled 
with organizational resources in a complementary way (Carpenter et al., 2001). 
Research on returnees has suggested that compared to domestic entrepreneurs their 
competitive strengths typically lie in a) their access to international networks to better mobilize global 
resources especially ﬁnance and b) their superior technological knowhow (Filatotchev et al., 2009; Liu et 
al., 2010; Wright et al., 2008). Thus, returnees who build their businesses around these strengths, 
namely successfully deploying substantial international resources and engaging in technological 
innovation, are more able to capitalize on these unique competencies, leading to smoother execution of 
their business ideas and strategies. On the contrary, returnees who do not leverage these advantages 
can be considerably constrained in their actions. 
Further, the resource proﬁles of entrepreneurs can serve as a mechanism for important 
stakeholders to overcome information asymmetries (Robson et al., 2013). The provision of 
entrepreneurial ﬁnance is typically under-developed in returnees' home economies (Bruton et al., 2013). 
At the same time, home country economies may be able to beneﬁt from technology spillovers 
(Filatotchev et al., 2011). Entrepreneurs able to demonstrate their strengths in the above-mentioned 
areas, namely access to foreign sources of ﬁnance and innovative technology, could be rated favorably 
by local stakeholders and face lower barriers to setting up their businesses. Therefore in what follows 
we focus on the role of returnees in facilitating the entry of ventures with foreign capital and innovative 
technology. 
 
2.4.1. Returnee founders and foreign capital 
The resource-based view emphasizes the interaction between human capital and other forms of 
capital in wealth creation, of which ﬁnancial capital is one of the most important in the venture creation 
process. Indeed, the lack of access to ﬁnance is particularly challenging to start-ups (Westhead and 
Storey, 1997). Networked ﬁnancing becomes an important vehicle that substitutes for formal channels 
to gain access to ﬁnancial capital in emerging markets (Batjargal and Liu, 2004), which is not readily 
available to returnee entrepreneurs who have limited local networks to mobilize. Such networks take 
time to build. Returnee founders able to tap into ﬁnancial resources from abroad can save precious time 
from navigating the local ﬁnancial system and successfully kick start the new business faster. This issue 
is particularly relevant in setting up a business in China with its distinct regulatory and normative 
institutional environment (Becker, 2000). 
Sources of ﬁnancial capital may affect speed of entry not only because of varied screening 
approaches and the information sources adopted in the due diligence process, but also due to their 
interactions with founders in arriving at critical strategic decisions concerning business launch. 
Entrepreneurs rarely act in isolation in the venture creation process, rather important ex- change 
partners, particularly outside investors, have considerable inﬂuence over their actions (Vanacker et al., 
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2013). Seed- stage equity investors are often deeply involved in the early decision making process as 
important sources of ﬁnancial capital and strategic advice (Collewaert and Fassin, 2013). 
Investor-founder relationships can be a major source of dysfunctional conﬂicts and thus impede 
the venture creation and development process (Collewaert and Fassin, 2013). Escalated conﬂicts can 
retard decision making and actions, and even result in failure. Therefore, these interactions and 
dynamics between the founders and investors likely affect venture creation speed. Com- mon 
experiences can provide a shared basis for communication and building mutual trust, and enable 
decision makers to take strategic actions faster (Rousseau and Parks, 1993). Since shared understanding 
is more likely to be reached between founders and investors from the same normative environment, we 
would expect that returnee entrepreneurs are more able to communicate and reach consensus in a 
time-efﬁcient manner with foreign investors, reducing due diligence concerns of foreign investors that 
introduce delays in the investment decision process and moving faster in accomplishing the tasks 
needed for setting up the business. Thus: 
H4. Having a returnee founder moderates the effect of foreign capital on entry speed, such that 
a returnee founder weakens the negative effect of foreign capital on entry speed. 
 
2.4.2. Returnee founders and innovative technology 
The competitive advantage of returnees, compared to their local counterparts, oftentimes lies in 
their advanced technological knowhow resulting from their experience abroad (Kenney et al., 2013). 
Governments from emerging economies, including China, have been proactive in attracting returnees 
back and facilitating returnee entrepreneurship (Qin, 2016). Returnees are viewed as ‘conveyors of vital 
knowledge for the development of innovation activities’ (Filatotchev et al., 2011, p454). The value 
added/contribution of returnee entrepreneurs includes the ‘latest technology’ developed and brought 
back by them (Filatotchev et al., 2011, p454). However, past research has rarely looked into the 
differences among returnee-founded ﬁrms in their technological capabilities. The degree of 
innovativeness could vary considerably. Some returnees build their businesses around advanced 
technology they brought from overseas; others are merely lured by the booming market opportunities 
in the home country, seeking to capture the ‘rent’ from ﬁlling a market gap, without bringing back new 
and advanced technology (Qin, 2016). 
Returnee founders with innovative technology can be in a much stronger position to overcome 
hurdles relating to environ- mental scanning, resource gathering, networking, or obtaining training 
associated with preparation for entry into entrepreneur- ship (Katz, 1990). This is because they beneﬁt 
from a more focused opportunity search and analysis while doing environmental scanning and a much 
quicker process in attracting and liaising with critical partners and in assembling resources, therefore 
signiﬁcantly shortening the time in actualizing their ideas. The new venture creation process involves 
three main types of activities: legitimacy building activities, relationship building activities, and resource 
acquisition activities (Delmar and Shane, 2004). “Returnee entrepreneurs” are a special category of 
people in the Chinese economy, manifested in the fact that the label “sea turtles” is not only well 
established in the business community but also written into ofﬁcial government policies. “Sea turtles” or 
returnees are viewed as strategically important and valuable to the development of Chinese economy 
due to their contribution to technology upgrading in the home country. The typical proﬁle of a desirable 
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returnee entrepreneur is one that can bring back advanced technology in scarce supply domestically 
(Wadhwa et al., 2011). There are many programs offering returnees with advanced technology 
differential and favorable treatment. In some programs the beneﬁt is only available to returnees who ﬁt 
into the “high tech” category, involving lower challenges in building legitimacy and access to better 
resources. 
As a result, returnee entrepreneurs with innovative technology are also more motivated to 
move forward in setting up a business. Individuals are not equally motivated to complete the activities 
necessary in the gestation process (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009). This is also the case for returnees 
among whom many face high opportunity costs in creating a new venture in the home country. As 
innovative new ventures should have more potential upside gain (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009), 
returnee entrepreneurs have more conﬁdence in the new venture, and are more eager to complete the 
process. 
Moreover, the presence of returnees can enhance a ﬁrm's absorptive capacity relating to new 
technology (Liu et al., 2014). Similarly, Alnuaimi et al. (2012) found that Indian organizations that hire 
inventors from foreign organizations can be more productive than hiring inventors from other Indian 
organizations; when the inventors are recruited from abroad, their impact is even higher. Amason et al. 
(2006, p127) suggest that innovation is fundamentally ‘the introduction of something new’. In our 
context, some technologies that have been brought back by returnees are not absolutely novel to the 
world, but new to China and need to be further developed locally. While locals have little experience 
working on these technologies in China, returnees who have the exposure to such technologies from 
their overseas experience and understand them better could move faster in the further development 
and utilization of them. Thus it can be expected that novel technology in the hands of returnee 
entrepreneurs can be utilized faster, leading to expedited entry. 
Returnees bringing technology from abroad may also yield beneﬁts to local ﬁrms in the same 
high-tech industry through knowledge spillovers (Filatotchev et al., 2011). These returnee entrepreneurs 
can be more attractive to domestic ﬁrms, with the latter gaining access to more advanced technology 
that is otherwise unavailable to them (Wright et al., 2008). As a result, returnees with innovative 
technology are expected to be more welcome in the local business communities, which can in turn 
enable them enjoy an accelerated speed of entry. Hence: 
H5. Having a returnee founder moderates the effect of innovative technology on entry speed, 
such that a returnee founder weakens the negative effect of innovative technology on entry speed. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Setting and data 
 
Information about the process of business creation, especially regarding the pre-launch stage, is 
usually difﬁcult to obtain for quantitative analysis. We draw from a unique dataset comprising a wide 
range of technology start-ups in China. The data is built from a survey of technology ﬁrms in 13 major 
incubators and science parks in the biggest cluster of technology ﬁrms, Beijing and provides a suitable 
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setting in which to examine our research questions. Being able to capture emerging opportunities in a 
timely fashion is particularly important in a highly dynamic market environment. China features a rapidly 
changing and competitive environment, and Beijing is a hub of technological entrepreneurship in China. 
A signiﬁcant proportion of high-tech ﬁrms are concentrated in Beijing, and these are largely located in 
designated areas in the city with science parks and incubators. These science parks and incubators have 
attracted a substantial number of both returnee entrepreneurs and local entrepreneurs. Thus our set- 
ting presents an ideal laboratory to explore the process of early venture creation. A notable feature of 
the data is its coverage of a wide range of technology ventures across many science parks and 
incubators. 
The survey focused on the early phase of venture development process, and collected rich 
information about founders' back- ground and prior experience, the venture creation process, as well as 
the characteristics of the new businesses. The unique information about entrepreneurs' activities in the 
pre-launch seed stage provides an excellent opportunity to test our hypothesized effects on speed of 
entry. 
The questionnaire was distributed to randomly selected 1000 technology ﬁrms in 13 major 
incubators and science parks in Beijing in 2008. Four hundred and thirty questionnaires were returned, 
resulting in a response rate of 43%.2 Our ﬁnal sample consists of 388 ﬁrms reporting complete 
information. The industry distribution of ﬁrms in our data is in line with that of the population, 
indicating no systematic differences between the respondent and non-respondent ﬁrms across 
industries. Subsequent to the survey, in 2016 we also carried out additional face-to-face interviews with 
36 founders, comprising half returnees and half non-returnees, to verify their perceptions of our survey 
questions and to dig more deeply into the mechanisms behind the pat- terns we found in the data.3 
 
3.2. Variables 
 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable, speed of venture entry, relates to the time taken by the entrepreneur 
to set up the new venture. With a clear focus on the pre-launch phase of the business gestation process, 
we examine the time elapsed from ‘the conception of the business idea’ to ‘the launch of the company’ 
                                                          
2 Consultation was carried out with administrators and entrepreneurs in these science parks and incubators and 
the questions were pretested. We checked the interpretations of key questions by different respondents and there 
were no systematic differences across returnees and non-returnees. 
 
3  For instance, we asked speciﬁcally “Do you remember the time when you ﬁrst came up with the idea of this 
business?” “When was that? Please describe the situation.” The entrepreneurs could clearly recall the situation 
how they came up with the business idea and when that took place, with the accuracy of the time and situation. 
Many entrepreneurs commented that it was an unforgettable “Bingo” moment and an important turning point. 
Returnees did not interpret this question differently from non-returnees. 
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– the very initial stage of venture creation process. Given the complex and multi- faceted nature of the 
sequencing of start-up activities, to pinpoint the start point and end point of a gestation process is 
challenging to operationalize (Davidsson and Gordon, 2012; Dimov, 2011; Gordon, 2012). We chose to 
study the duration between the conception of the particular venture idea and the launch of the 
business, based on a careful review of measures discussed in the extant literature as well as our 
understanding of the context. McMullen and Dimov (2013, p. 1499) suggest that as entrepreneurship 
studies ‘the conditions under which the very nature of the unit of analysis transforms from one form 
(e.g. idea) into another (e.g. product, ﬁrm, etc.),’ the starting point is with an idea. Similarly, Gordon 
(2012) summarized two solutions for identifying when a venture creation process commences, one 
being when the particular venture creation idea is acknowledged. We chose ﬁrm launch as the ending 
point based on insights from previous research. For instance, McMullen and Dimov (2013) proposed two 
conclusions to the entrepreneurial journey – one in reference to a new product offering, the other 
relating to the ﬁrm that is responsible for introducing this new product offering.4 Building on these 
insights, we believe studying the duration that concludes with the launch of the ﬁrm is meaningful and 
relevant. We do not view it as the end to the venture creation process, but an important output in this 
process. Some scholars have posited the accumulation of venture creation activities as ‘progress’ toward 
venture creation (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009). If we view the entrepreneurial process as 
comprising important milestones (Cunneen et al., 2007), business launch is one of the most important 
milestones in this process. To check that the measures we adopted were suitable for the speciﬁc 
(Chinese) context, we held discussions with entrepreneurs, academics, administrators of the science 
parks (who play an important role in the entrepreneurship ecosystem in the locality that we study) who 
conﬁrmed the validity of the attributes of the measures. 
We constructed our dependent variable as the additive inverse of the logarithm of the months 
involved in this process.5 
 
3.2.2. Explanatory variables 
Our key independent variable, returnee entrepreneur, is constructed as a dummy  variable,  
which  takes the value  1 if the founder is a returnee from overseas, and 0 otherwise.6 We also  include 
key  variables  reﬂecting  venture's  resources  – source of ﬁnancial capital and technology novelty. In 
order to measure sources of capital, we construct a dummy variable foreign capital, derived from the 
information on the ﬁrm's ownership at the time when it was launched. It takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm 
was backed by foreign capital,  0 otherwise.  To measure innovative technology, we construct  a dummy 
variable  that  takes the value  1 if  the  new venture has novel technology. Consistent with other studies  
(Amason  et  al.,  2006;  Gordon,  2012),  and  because  of  the  early stage and wider variety of 
technology across the sample, we adopt a subjective measure measured  by whether  the respondent 
                                                          
4 Our interviews revealed a great variation in the interpretation of the exact time for a new product offering, and 
there was less confusion or misunderstanding when it came to the launch of the business. 
 
5 The log form is adopted to account for the convexity effect. 
6 We followed the commonly used deﬁnition of returnees (United Nations, 1998; Lemaitre, 2005; King, 2012). 
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agreed with the statement that the venture's technology was not available before, or better than what 
was available before.7 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
We also include in our analysis a number of control variables that may affect the outcome of 
speed of venture creation. In particular, we control for aspects of career experiences that previous 
studies have suggested to be relevant to entrepreneurship entry. Previous studies have suggested that 
entrepreneurs who have founded a business before can be more effective and successful in starting up 
subsequent ventures (Westhead and Wright, 1998; Westhead et al., 2009). Hence we control for former 
ﬁrm-founding experience (novice entrepreneur = 1, 0 otherwise). Domain knowledge, especially 
industry experience, is another important factor inﬂuencing entrepreneurship entry (Rotefoss and 
Kolvereid, 2005). Thus we control for previous industry experience. 
We also include demographic information such as age and measurement of human capital such 
as the level of education. For- mal education is associated with entrepreneurship entry (Lazear, 2004; 
Ucbasaran et al., 2008). As in our sample almost all entrepreneurs have university-level education and 
above, we control for advanced degree at the Masters level and beyond. Another possible inﬂuence on 
the venture creation process could be the features of the founding team (Clarysse and Moray, 2004; 
Delmar and Shane, 2006; Steffens et al., 2012). There might exist signiﬁcant variation in the size of 
founding team. Thus we add the size of the founding team to our set of control variables. Setting up a 
new venture is psychologically a big step (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009), especially for returnees 
who engage in risky venture creation activities in a less familiar environment. Thus who are in the 
founding team might affect the speed to entry. Taking advantage of the unique information we have in 
our data about the founding team, we controlled not only team size but team make-up. We include two 
dummy variables reﬂecting whether the founding team includes friends or family members who can 
provide support that helps to overcome the psychological challenges in the process. 
Features of the new venture could matter to the speed of setting up the business. New ventures 
might be created to capture different types of opportunities (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009; Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). Thus we controlled for op- portunity characteristics. Based on respondents' 
declarations about what triggered them to start the company, we differentiated between technology-
driven opportunities, market-driven opportunities, and others. We included two control variables, 
technology-driven opportunities and market-driven opportunities, in the regressions. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The average age of founders is around 36 years, and 
three quarters have received advanced education. There is a roughly even divide between returnee and 
local founders – around 60% of the ﬁrms were founded by returnees from overseas; such variation 
makes this sample desirable to examine the effect of entrepreneurs' foreign (versus local) experience. 
                                                          
7 Similar operationalization of novel technology is used in other studies such as Liao and Welsch (2008) and Gordon 
(2012). We experimented with various alter- native measures and chose the one that best suits the context. Our 
interviews also revealed that more complex alternative measures used in other studies     (e.g., whether the 
technology is new to the ﬁrm, to the community, to the country, etc.) caused confusion in this context. 
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On average it takes 8.3 months to move from the conception of the business idea to launching the 
business. The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2. We checked multicollinearity using variance 
inﬂation factors (VIFs) which are well below 10, showing no concerns about multicollinearity in the data. 
The proposed hypotheses in the theory section are tested using ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression analysis. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis on venture creation speed. Four models are 
reported in the table. Model A presents the main effects; Models B and C include the interaction terms 
between returnee founder and innovative technology and between returnee founder and foreign 
capital, respectively; Model D includes the complete set of variables speciﬁed in Section 3. 
  
       
Variable Mean Std. Dev. VIF 
Speed -2.11 0.65  
Returnee 0.61 0.49 1.27 
Foreign capital 0.10 0.30 1.13 
Innovative technology 0.85 0.36 1.17 
Founder graduate degree 0.75 0.43 1.23 
Previous industry experience 0.37 0.48 1.14 
New entrepreneur 0.79 0.41 1.05 
Log founding team size 1.16 0.63 1.05 
Age 36.39 7.29 1.24 
Co-founder friend 0.75 0.43 1.65 
Co-founder family 0.11 0.31 1.65 
Market opportunity 0.38 0.49 1.04 
Technology opportunity 0.59 0.49 1.21 
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Table 2: Correlation between key variables 
 
Speed Returnee Foreign 
capital 
Innovative 
technology 
Founder 
graduate 
degree 
Previous 
industry 
experience 
Speed  1      
Returnee -0.1947 1     
Foreign capital -0.1669 0.2011 1    
Innovative technology -0.0923 0.0656 0.1184 1   
Founder graduate degree -0.1429 0.4059 0.137 0.0584 1  
Previous industry experience -0.1435 0.0593 0.1411 0.1894 0.0154 1 
New entrepreneur -0.0576 -0.0555 -0.0712 -0.0424 -0.0544 0.0132 
Log founding team size -0.0493 -0.1387 -0.0671 0.0271 -0.1256 0.0975 
Age -0.1529 0.1311 0.2784 0.2312 0.1416 0.1981 
Co-founder friend -0.036 -0.0657 -0.002 -0.0561 0 -0.0633 
Co-founder family 0.0511 0.0629 0.0153 -0.0362 0.0711 0.0497 
Market opportunity -0.0613 0.0744 0.0341 0.0123 0.0061 0.1478 
Technology opportunity -0.0287 0.1625 0.1274 0.3121 0.0998 0.2104 
 
Table 2: Correlation between key variables (cont’d) 
  
New 
entrepreneur 
Log 
founding 
team size 
Age Co-
founder 
friend 
Co-
founder 
family 
Market 
opportunity 
Technology 
opportunity 
New 
entrepreneur 1       
Log founding 
team size -0.0007 1      
Age -0.1858 -0.0162 1     
Co-founder 
friend 0.0213 0.0737 0.0007 1    
Co-founder 
family 0.004 -0.0847 0.0034 -0.6157 1   
Market 
opportunity 0.003 -0.0172 -0.015 0.0015 -0.037 1  
Technology 
opportunity 0.0126 -0.0292 0.2574 -0.0163 -0.0063 0.1063 1 
 
Hypothesis 1, concerning the effect of local versus overseas experience on venture entry speed, 
receives strong support; there is a negative association between returnee entrepreneurs and the speed 
to set up the business, and the coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% level in models A, B, C, 
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and the 0.1% level in the full model). Hypothesis 2 posits a negative effect between foreign capital and 
venture entry speed. A strong negative effect on venture entry speed is found for foreign-capital-backed 
ﬁrms across the four models (at the 5% level in model B, C, D), lending support to this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 about the effect of innovative technology on venture entry speed is supported in Model B 
and Model D (at the 5% level), where the interaction term of innovative technology and returnee 
founder is included in the regressions. The results reveal a negative effect between the two variables. 
The results also show evidence in support of the two hypotheses on the interaction effects 
between returnee founder and venture's resources. A positive effect of the interaction term between 
foreign capital and returnee entrepreneurship on the speed to entry is observed. Ventures backed by 
foreign capital, in general, have a much slower speed to set up than domestic ventures. However, 
foreign-capital-backed ﬁrms led by a returnee founder can signiﬁcantly speed up the process of 
launching the business, in line with Hypothesis 4. The interaction term between innovative technology 
and returnee is positive, consistent with Hypothesis 5 that postulates a positive moderating effect of 
returnee founder on the relationship between innovative technology and speed to entry. 
To further illustrate these interaction effects, we plot the effects of technology and foreign 
capital resources on entry speed for ventures with returnee founders and for those with homegrown 
founders. As shown in Fig. 2, the gap in entry speed between foreign-capital-backed ﬁrms and domestic-
capital-backed ﬁrms is much smaller when the venture is led by a returnee entrepreneur. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 4 positing that returnee founder mitigates the negative effect of foreign 
capital on entry speed. The interaction plot between innovative technology and returnee founder is 
displayed in Fig. 3. It shows that for ventures led by home-grown entrepreneurs, the speed to entry is 
much slower for those with innovative technologies. Having a returnee founder changes the situation: 
when led by a returnee founder, the entry speed is faster for ventures with innovative technology. This 
pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 5. 
The results also demonstrate some interesting patterns concerning our control variables. As 
anticipated, prior ﬁrm-founding experience shows a signiﬁcant effect on venture creation speed; it takes 
novice entrepreneurs longer to enact the business idea than more experienced entrepreneurs. In 
addition a negative association between the entrepreneur's age and the speed to entry is observed, 
indicating that younger entrepreneurs act faster in moving from the idea to setting up the business. 
 
4.1. Robustness check 
We performed the following robustness checks. First, to account for possible variations across 
industries and over time, we controlled for industry dummies and year dummies. These variables are 
not signiﬁcant. Second, to account for the time lag be- tween returning to China and starting up a 
business, we added a variable capturing the time since returning from abroad. The key hypothesized 
relationships remain unchanged after these changes to the model speciﬁcation. 
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Table 3: Regression results of entry speed 
  Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Returnee (H1) -0.2029** 
(0.0737) 
-0.5331** 
(0.1668) 
-0.2327** 
(0.0749) 
-0.5365*** 
(0.1663) 
Foreign capital (H2) -0.2126~ 
(0.1117) 
-0.2269* 
(0.1113) 
-0.8154* 
(0.3221) 
-0.7748* 
(0.3213) 
Innovative technology (H3) -0.091 
(0.0968) 
-0.3037* 
(0.1364) 
-0.0907 
(0.0964) 
-0.2882* 
(0.1362) 
Founder graduate degree  -0.1126 
(0.0817) 
-0.1236 
(0.0814) 
-0.1069 
(0.0814) 
-0.1176 
(0.0813) 
Previous industry experience -0.1292~ 
(0.0703) 
-0.1389* 
(0.0701) 
-0.1242~ 
(0.0701) 
-0.1337~ 
(0.0699) 
New entrepreneur -0.157* 
(0.0796) 
-0.1619* 
(0.0792) 
-0.1551~ 
(0.0793) 
-0.1599* 
(0.079) 
Log founding team size -0.0731 
(0.0523) 
-0.0648 
(0.0522) 
-0.0727 
(0.0521) 
-0.065 
(0.052) 
Age -0.0095~ 
(0.0049) 
-0.0089~ 
(0.0049) 
-0.0091~ 
(0.0049) 
-0.0086~ 
(0.0049) 
Co-founder friend -0.0163 
(0.0948) 
0.0002 
(0.0947) 
-0.0092 
(0.0945) 
0.0055 
(0.0944) 
Co-founder family 0.1199 
(0.1305) 
0.1374 
(0.1301) 
0.1192 
(0.13) 
0.1355 
(0.1297) 
Market opportunity -0.0546 
(0.0672) 
-0.0615 
(0.067) 
-0.051 
(0.067) 
-0.0577 
(0.0668) 
Technology opportunity 0.1097 
(0.0714) 
0.0969 
(0.0712) 
0.1099 
(0.0711) 
0.098 
(0.071) 
Returnee*Innovative technology 
(H5) 
 
0.4023* 
(0.1826) 
 
0.3734* 
(0.1828) 
Returnee*Foreign capital (H4) 
  
0.6748* 
(0.3383) 
0.6145~ 
(0.3382) 
Constant -1.2484*** 
(0.2281) 
-1.0958*** 
(0.2373) 
-1.2611*** 
(0.2273) 
-1.1184*** 
(0.2369) 
     
 
    
Number of observations 388 388 388 388 
R-square 0.1038 0.1153 0.1133 0.1231 
 Standard deviations are given in the parenthesis. P-value key: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05, ~<0.1. P-
values are computed using two-sided tests.  
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Figure 2: Interaction plot: returnee and foreign capital on entry speed 
 
 
Figure 3: Interaction plot: returnee and innovation technology on entry speed 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this paper, our model and empirical analysis have sought to advance understanding of key 
resource inﬂuences on venture creation speed by returnee entrepreneurs. Scholars have called for 
closer scrutiny of the intersection of time and entrepreneurial organization (Bird and West, 1997; 
McMullen and Dimov, 2013). Yet limited empirical progress has been made with respect to the 
understanding of temporal dimensions of the entrepreneurial process. We believe that this temporal 
dimension is crucial to entrepreneurial actions and subsequent performance of ventures created by 
returnee entrepreneurs. There is scant research on the roles of venture resources and founder 
characteristics in facilitating venture creation speed (Capelleras and Greene, 2008). By exploring how 
the founder is a returnee or not inﬂuences the role of venture resources in the speed of venture entry, 
we show that absence from the home market context can slow entry speed. Firms with innovative 
technology and with foreign capital are slower to set up due to higher levels of liability of newness and 
liability of foreignness. However, when these ﬁrms have a returnee founder who can leverage their 
experience with foreign resources and technological knowhow, such negative effects on entry speed are 
signiﬁcantly mitigated. 
By studying how returnee entrepreneurs interact with venture resources to inﬂuence venture 
creation speed, we contribute ﬁrstly to advancing research on returnee entrepreneurship. New venture 
creation activities undertaken by entrepreneurs returning from overseas have attracted increasing 
attention among entrepreneurship scholars (e.g. Liu et al., 2014; Qin and Estrin, 2015; Wright et al., 
2008). Returnees assume a unique role in ﬁlling important entrepreneurial gaps in emerging markets (Li 
et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2010) and in bringing back new knowledge (Qin, 2015, 2016; Wang, 2014). 
Returnees' possession of advanced technological knowhow and access to global networks can help 
boost the development of technology industries in their home countries. Much attention has been 
devoted to the outcomes of businesses created by returnees (Wright et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2010). We 
contribute by adding to an emerging series of studies addressing the challenges faced by returnee 
entrepreneurs compared to their local counterparts by exploring factors that facilitate or impede their 
venture creation. Interestingly, while past research has placed emphasis on resources associated with 
social capital in the context of returnee entrepreneurship (Lin et al., 2015), we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant 
coefﬁcients in respect of our variables relating to the role of family and friends. Rather, speed of entry 
by returnees is strongly related to ﬁnancial and technology resources, pointing to the importance of 
these dimensions. Further research is needed to explore the role of various types of resources, perhaps 
on other outcome variables related to venture creation and performance. 
Second, in studying returnees and non-returnees in China we contribute by shedding new light 
on the temporal dimension of the business gestation process in different contexts. A paucity of analysis 
of context in entrepreneurship research has been noted by a number of entrepreneurship scholars (e.g., 
Foss et al., 2013; Sarasvathy and Venkataraman, 2011; Ucbasaran et al., 2001; Zahra et al., 2014). In 
particular, prevailing theory on speed, while placing emphasis on psychological traits and management 
processes, is contextually limited (Forbes, 2005). By comparing the gestation process between returnee 
and local entrepreneurs, we extend the limited previous analyses that have suggested the importance of 
experience in different institutional environments (Forbes, 2005; Markman et al., 2005) to highlight that 
time to entry may vary between different types of founders. 
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Our ﬁndings suggest a number of implications for practice and policy. Returnee entrepreneurs 
need to be aware that exposure to commercial environments in developed economies is not sufﬁcient 
to facilitate speedy entry into their home market. Returnees able to access foreign capital as a result of 
their experiences in developed economies build ﬁnancial resources that enable speedier access to 
markets; this may imply that ventures need to be at a more advanced stage of gestation in order to 
attract such ﬁnance. Returnees who can develop innovative technology prior to entry may be at a 
resource advantage compared to local entrepreneurs and thus are able to enter environments of 
technological deﬁcits more speedily. Similarly, local governments may ﬁnd it attractive to focus policy 
support on enabling domestic entrepreneurs to obtain spillover beneﬁts from entry by returnee 
entrepreneurs. 
Our study has several limitations providing opportunities for further research. First, our study is 
based on a cross-sectional sur- vey. However, such a survey was necessary in order to capture the 
variables of interest.  Although  beyond the scope of this study,  an avenue for future research 
addressing questions concerning the success of entry could be to resurvey entrepreneurs at a sub- 
sequent date and/or to link survey work with archival datasets. Second, future research might usefully 
undertake a qualitative exploration of the speed of the gestation  process in order to understand  how 
returnee  entrepreneurs  access ﬁnance and how they     go about setting up their venture. Such work 
would seem to need interviews with returnee entrepreneurs as well as ﬁnance providers, local ofﬁcials 
and local suppliers and customers. Third, our measure of innovative technology is self-assessed and, 
although similar operationalization has been commonly used in entrepreneurship research, future 
studies might attempt to identify more objective measures. Fourth, as there was a possibility of biases 
due to a lack of instrument equivalence, where questions/responses mean different things for returnees 
vs. other founders, our interviews sought to explore to what extent these differences were present but 
did not identify issues relating to interpretation of meaning. As all ﬁrms were from science parks and 
incubators, we suggest that this provides for a commonality of understanding of the venture creation 
process that serves to mitigate the potential problems of instrument equivalence. Fifth, although we 
undertook some checks for potential recall bias, as noted in the Method section, future  studies  might 
seek to adopt a longitudinal  approach that follows  the development  of the start-up process  in real 
time in order to reduce issues of memory decay and hindsight bias (Davidsson and Reynolds, 2009). 
Given such data is still scarce and particularly difﬁcult to organize in emerging  economy settings  like 
China, the data we currently  have is valuable  in that it gives unique insights into entrepreneurship in 
China. Furthermore, our focus has  been on technological  ventures based in science parks and 
incubators. Future research on speed of entry by returnees may also seek to explore non-technology  
based ventures. Our analysis focused only on returnees to China, yet returnees are also found in India 
and elsewhere. Emerging economies differ in terms of their institutional regimes (Hoskisson et al., 2013) 
and the extent of their entrepreneurial activity (Acs et al., 2015). Further studies are required of the role 
of resources in venture entry speed in other emerging economy contexts with different institutional 
regimes and entrepreneurial activity. Finally, our theoretical arguments relate to general mechanisms 
and since at the time of our study the science parks had been established for some 20 years, our 
ﬁndings relate to a quite evolved stage of an emerging market. Future studies using more recent data 
could be undertaken to conﬁrm or disconﬁrm our ﬁndings. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study provides new insights regarding the interplay of 
venture resources and founder experiences in the speed of venture entry and opens up opportunities 
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for further research into the contextual inﬂuences on temporal dimension of the gestation process in 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
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